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FOREIGN POLICY
BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events

1918-1950

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION · INCORPORATED · 22 EAST 38TH STREET · NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXX No. 1 OCTOBER 13, 1950

'Planned Revolution' Seen as Necessary in Korea*

As the Korean war moves into its guerrilla phase, United Nations forces have still another opportunity to learn a valuable lesson from experience. In the first three months of the Korean "incident" we have learned that Communist methods can take peasant conscripts and produce tough and effective troops who need only a foreign supply of tanks and tommy guns to make a formidable striking force. In this first phase of formal warfare we gained a brilliant victory because our air supremacy was unchallenged and because Korea is a peninsula where amphibious operations could be used to pinch off the Seoul bottleneck. For future reference let us note carefully that, lacking air supremacy and a peninsular terrain which we could envelop by sea, we would have had a much more difficult time waging positional warfare in Korea.

Need for Political Action

The second phase is now beginning with the disappearance of Communist forces, rather than their surrender. The UN troops now face an utterly different military problem. Logistics, at which we excel, must now give way to politics and political organization, for which we are totally unprepared. It does not matter how many tons, nor how much firepower, we can concentrate by sea, air and land at any given point in Korea. Guerrilla warfare is essentially a struggle for the cooperation of the peasantry and must be waged by more than military means.

The magnitude of this problem has been indicated in China, Indo-China, Malaya and the Philippines. Given a territorial base, guerrilla forces of inferior numbers can tie up much larger antiguerrilla forces for indefinitely long periods, particularly if they can be supplied across a friendly border. Even if the outlying villages in the guerrilla zone are unfriendly to them, as in Malaya, the guerrillas can maintain themselves for long periods by terror and reprisals after the fashion of bandits. If the farming population, however, is won over to the guerrilla cause, as happened in North China, the countryside and eventually the whole country may follow suit. In the densely populated areas of rice cultivation in east and south Asia, where hundreds of poor peasants live on each square mile of cultivated land, it is the mass of the rural populace who provide the real sinews of war (food and soldiers) and constitute the strategic prize of total warfare. The terrain may be held and policed in a physical sense by a network of roads and blockhouses, but as long as organized resistance continues among the peasantry, there is no possibility of solution, merely a stalemate.

We must now learn without delay that in modern warfare in Asia the conquest of terrain by foot-slogging infantry, aided by modern arms and mobility, is only a first and preliminary phase. The main theater of war is not geographical but psychological, in the minds and hearts of the teeming peasant community who inhabit the land. In this phase of modern Asian warfare a number of new dimensions of strategy are added to those with which we are familiar from our Western experience.

Winning the Peasant

The primary strategic object is the political organization of the peasantry in support of the antiguerrilla regime. This political organization cannot be separated from measures of social organization, educational indoctrination and economic reforms—in short, a social revolution. In peasant Asia the *status quo ante* is not a cause through which political organization can be effected. "Things-as-they-have-been" has no appeal and provides no dynamism. Non-Communist forces can compete with the Communist program only by working out in theory and applying in practice an over-all and equally comprehensive program of change and development. In a scene where social revolution—deep change in all aspects of life—is already under way, an established regime has to move fast to keep itself in power. It cannot devote itself to protecting established interests, least of all absentee landlords, but must devote its energy to organizing a new society and creating new interest-groups. This amounts to planned "revolution" and requires strong, courageous and far-seeing leadership.

The chief means by which an Asian regime can effect the political organization of the peasantry is the new class of student youth. Just as we in time of war recruit our most vigorous young men to be soldiers, so an Asian revolutionary leadership must recruit the idealistic youth of the land as cadres to carry out

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*This article is published in cooperation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

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the tasks of revolutionary organization. Let us remember that peasant countries have in the past been socially bifurcated into the illiterate farming masses and the educated elite. The literate few, typified today by the student class, are naturally looked to for leadership. The student class in addition is precisely the group accessible to the new socio-political doctrines, responsive to the call of nationalism and social justice.

Building Leadership

From these brief considerations it follows that the only prospect of a non-Communist settlement in Korea lies in the activation of a vigorous movement of social change and "revolution," which must enlist the youth of Korea as its active protagonists and must aim at the social and political organization of the peasant population. Foreign military and economic technical aid are necessary but secondary elements in such a program. The main job must be done by a youthful Korean leadership.

The only hope of an outcome in Korea satisfactory to the United States thus lies in the inspiration and guidance of such a leadership. Merely to pose this problem indicates its difficulty. Our respect for the principle of self-determination, our pluralistic, nonauthoritarian way of doing things, our ignorance of peasant wants and foreign lands all handicap us. We cannot create overnight the democratic equivalent of the Russian-trained Korean Communist cadres of party workers and guerrilla leaders.

Lacking such a democratic equivalent, however, we will have little or no future in revolutionary Asia. It therefore behooves us to set up a socio-political command, a general staff devoted to social plans and operations in the supramilitary sphere, an organized group of specialists and coordinators assigned to the task of welding our programs of military and economic aid, technical assistance, information, education and cultural exchange into a more closely integrated, planned and comprehensive whole. Such a socio-political high command would act on the assumption that land reform, industrialism, patriotism, the idealism of youth and the remaking of peasant life can be combined and used for truly democratic ends. It would assume that Asia need not go to communism by default, and that a properly "revolutionary" alternative to communism can be offered to Asian peoples from the non-Communist world under United Nations auspices and with United States aid. Many of the ingredients of such an over-all program—military, economic, technical, cultural, intellectual—are ready at hand to be mobilized. But a vigorous creative effort is needed on our part, the first step in which must be a deeper and closer knowledge of the great Asian revolution.

JOHN KING FAIRBANK

(John King Fairbank spent seven years in China, concluding a variety of United States government services as Director of the United States Information Service in that country. At present he is in charge of the Regional Program on China at Harvard University. His book, *The United States and China,* was published in 1948 by the Harvard University Press.)

Will Korean Victory Sap U.S. Mobilization Effort?

WASHINGTON—The good news from Korea creates problems for the framers and executors of United States foreign policy. Under the stimulus of the Korean crisis the Administration has had ample support for expansion of the armed forces, enlargement of the program of military aid to friendly powers abroad, and institution of a flexible system for regulating the American domestic economy so that civilian wants will not delay the increase in armaments.

Now that the tide of battle in Korea is carrying us toward victory, the Administration has begun openly to express concern lest the public lose interest in armaments in the absence of a militarily active enemy and in the presence of a falling standard of living, increasing taxes and the induction of greater numbers of men—relatives, friends or valued employes—into the Army, Navy or Air Force. President Truman, W. Averill Harriman, the President's adviser on foreign affairs, General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Stuart Symington, chairman of the National Security and Resources Board, have all given public warnings lately against relaxing the effort that was taken in response to the Korean conflict, but was taken not so much in order to frustrate the aggressive North Koreans as to prevent a repetition of the Korean affair in some other part of the world.

Foreign Policy at Home

The Administration's uncertainty about public attitudes affects its conduct of foreign affairs because it prevents the development of the vigorous program of economic controls which current foreign policy calls for. To advance the supply of armaments here and in the North Atlantic pact countries, the new National Production Authority is limiting the quantity of steel and nonferrous metals available for the manufacture of civilian goods, and Congress and the Federal Reserve Board are restricting the ability of civilians to buy in the contracting market by raising taxes and revising credit rules. But the Administration has not faced the problem of inflation which is arising with the gradual re-establishment of the sellers' market that disappeared after the country's adjustment to peacetime life within the past three years. Inflation, now obvious, took by surprise the President's Council of Economic Advisers, who suggested in their mid-year report that the Korean affair would not force serious increases in prices. In the Defense Production Act of 1950, which became law in September, Congress authorized the President to institute price controls provided he set wage ceilings on the same commodities for which he fixed prices. The President not only has not used this power, but he only appointed the Administrator of Economic Stabilization—Dr. Alan Valentine, former president of the University of Rochester—on October 7. The new agency is empowered to determine the need for wage and price controls and to establish ceilings where it finds controls necessary. An imposing question in Washington today is whether the use of this power will create opposition to the foreign policy which cannot be adequately executed as long as the power goes unused.

The absence of restraints over the current upward course of prices is reducing the quantity of armaments which the Defense Department can buy with existing large appropriations. The Treasury, therefore, will have difficulty paying for defense mainly out of tax revenue. Despite rising taxes, the value to the Treasury of each dollar it receives is lessening. John McCone, Undersecretary for Air, told a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on October 3 that his department today can buy 750 fewer jet planes than it could have bought in

April with the same amount of money. Mr. McCone indicated the price trends in a few of the many materials necessary in manufacturing an airplane—crude rubber, up 128.9 per cent; tin, 32.9 per cent; copper, 23.6 per cent; aluminum, 2.9 per cent. The rise also disturbs friendly powers abroad, which cannot obtain as much for their Marshall plan dollars in October as they could in June. Moreover, the arms programs which the North Atlantic Council is encouraging all North Atlantic pact powers to undertake in their industrial plants subject those countries to inflationary strains which can hardly be relieved on a country-to-country basis. Some sort of international price control arrangement among the North Atlantic powers, as suggested by France in September, is becoming desirable.

Coherent Explanation Needed

"Our policy is one of the creation of areas of strength, . . . and after those areas of strength have been created, it is hoped that we will be able to negotiate a permanent settlement without World War III," Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut, said on July 5 during hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee on the international information and education program. The Administration might find that it was needlessly concerned about the willingness of the public to make sacrifices in the name of foreign policy, in times not obviously critical, if its spokesmen would expound clearly—as the arguments for the United Nations and the Marshall plan were once expounded—its reasons for assuming that the Soviet Union, faced with strength, would show an interest in serious negotiation. One hazard in the way of such a program of public education is that the President and his advisers, disappointed in the outcome of previous conversations with Soviet officials, have complained in the past that the Russians do not carry out their side of the bargain in negotiated agreements. A clearer concept of what "negotiation from strength" may be expected to accomplish is plainly called for, and this in turn means the redefinition of American aims.

BLAIR BOLLES

South Africa Troubled by Worsening Race Relations

In recent years there has been a rapid deterioration in the attitude towards Europeans (the term for whites in South Africa) among all sections of the non-European population of the Union. The non-European, moreover, now rarely discriminates between different sections of the white population which he denounces.

His leaders tolerate for the time being such a body as the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations, whose officers still like to feel that they are directing an interracial organization. In fact, however, the younger Bantu intelligentsia are increasingly suspicious of the institute, and leaders of the important one-million-strong Cape Colored community refused to take any part in its January 1950 annual conference.

The policy of those who control the African (Bantu) National Congress, for the time being, is to discourage sporadic strikes or riots in which the odds still favor the armed and better organized police. At the same time, they appear to be advocating not advancement of the non-European within the existing economic and social structure of the Union, but preparation for the establishment of an African national state of South Africa in place of the Union.

Is Communism Important?

The migratory character of much labor in the mines, in industry and elsewhere, on which the European economy of South Africa today so largely depends, makes it well-nigh impossible to set limits to the extent and effectiveness of such propaganda when the Bantu returns from his temporary urban environment to his Kraal in the reserves. Moreover, imprisonment for such acts as defying the European's pass laws is no longer a disgrace but almost a test of the young Bantu's manhood.

Educated Africans reject suggestions that external, including Communist, influences are chiefly responsible for non-European agitation. The Communists' disclaimer of racial discrimination and their program of action, frequently contrasted with the liberals' talk of gradual progress, are increasingly attractive to many in the Bantu or Cape Colored rank and file, most of whom, however, are said to be either ignorant of, or indifferent to, the rest of Communist ideology.

Agitation by Africans outside the Union is a source of encouragement to the native South African, but Bantu leaders and students insist that their attention centers almost exclusively on "their own" South Africa. Said one native teacher in Natal: "It is enough for us to know the lessons of South African history. The story of our own country has proved what a suppressed majority can do to assert itself against a dominant minority. What the Afrikaners have done against the English since the Boer War, we Africans can do against all Europeans in due course."

All three sections of the powerful Afrikaans-speaking Dutch Reformed Church are acutely aware of the threat presented by the increasing hostility of natives to their mission activity. They are much disturbed at the effect of the material influences of an increasingly urbanized life upon both European and non-European. Already these influences have robbed the Church of many Afrikaner members in the towns. A desire to keep future urbanized Afrikaners within the Church is the basic explanation of the advocacy of "single-medium" schools (schools which use only one medium of instruction, either Afrikaans or English) and "Christian National Education," which would insure Church control of Afrikaner children from kindergarten to university.

Position of Broederbund

Other Afrikaners—usually on the opposite side of the political fence—heatedly decline to accept this explanation of "Christian National Education." To them the Dutch Reformed Church's "offensive" in the field of education is the result of a deliberate attempt of Afrikaner politicians and intellectuals to control the Church for their own purposes as part of a coldly calculated program of domination of all aspects of the national life of South Africa. This explanation is freely coupled with varying accounts of the *Broederbund,* the secret Afrikaner organization known to include among its members leaders in the cabinet, Church and universities. The *Broederbund* is alleged to have Nazi-like cells in all government departments, industries, sporting and cultural associations.

But the nature and extent of the influence of the *Broederbund* is one subject on which any outside observer must hesitate to pass judgment for lack of sufficient evidence. With less hesitation, however, it may be said that the marked deterioration in interrace relations has produced an atmosphere of increasing uneasiness among the European population of the Union. In some cases it has brought about a certain defeatism, even giving rise to speculation regarding what country would offer the most attractive asylum if the worst should come to the worst in the Union. This state of mind is rarely found among Afrikaners, who see no future for their own language and culture outside the country where they established themselves and who, in the last resort, would be prepared to stay and "shoot it out."

Paradoxical as it may seem, the Afrikaner's consciousness of increasing racial tension, combined with economic changes (which have emphasized South Africa's inability to stand aloof from world economic developments) and his ideological hostility to communism at home and abroad appear to have made the South African nationalist much more ready to welcome continuance of some form of external political association than he was 20 years ago.

Afrikaner interest in the outside world shows itself most sharply in his attitude to African neighbor states, especially Southern Rhodesia, where there now is an Afrikaans-speaking minority variously estimated as between 17 and 22 per cent of the European population of this self-governing British colony. The Afrikaner joins with English-speaking South Africans in vigorous criticism of Indian immigration into Kenya, not merely because subsequent penetration into the Union might increase the Indian problem in Natal but also because of what has frequently been described as a potential, if not actual, program of Indian imperialist expansion in eastern and southern Africa. The Afrikaner still speaks with suspicion of "English" colonial policy and deeply resents either British or United Nations criticism of his own native policy. But he appears to have acquired an increasing appreciation of the practical value of membership in the Commonwealth. It seems safe to suggest that Prime Minister Daniel F. Malan himself and the majority of his followers, although they still favor a South African Republic, would prefer to follow the example of India rather than of Eire and to remain within the Commonwealth.

This latter trend of Afrikaner opinion has weakened one serious obstacle to the political merger between moderate Nationalists and the conservative majority of the United party, to which reference was made in the first article in this series. Precipitate action at any time by politically self-conscious but imperfectly disciplined Bantu or Cape Colored strikers or rioters might break down other barriers and produce a new Afrikaner-English political combination. Such a new group would be moderate in its inter-European attitudes, but it would almost certainly adopt a policy towards nonwhites which its friends would describe as firm and realistic but which others might well regard as frankly repressive.

FRED ALEXANDER

(The last of three articles on South Africa by Professor Alexander of the University of Western Australia.)

The New Federalist, by Publius II, by Justice Owen J. Roberts, John F. Schmidt and Clarence K. Streit. New York, Harper, 1950. $1.50.

A series of essays, applying the principles of the Federalist to the problem of world organization in our times, which first appeared in *Freedom and Union,* the organ of Federal Union, Inc.

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BOSTON, October 16, *The United Nations,* Hon. William Phillips

NEW ORLEANS, October 16, Karl Gruber, Foreign Minister of Austria

NEW YORK, October 16, *Korean and Formosan Developments,* Col. T. H. Murphy, Fred W. Riggs

CLEVELAND, October 17, *Formula for Force—U.S. in the UN,* S. L. A. Marshall

DETROIT, October 17, *America's Policy: War or Peace?,* Alfred H. Kelly

ST. LOUIS, October 18, Karl Gruber, Foreign Minister of Austria

CINCINNATI, October 19, Karl Gruber, Foreign Minister of Austria

MINNEAPOLIS, October 19, M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan

NEW YORK, October 19, *Korea Focuses Attention on Armaments,* Frank C. Nash

BUFFALO, October 21, Karl Gruber, Foreign Minister of Austria

NEW YORK, October 21, High School Forum on Germany

BOSTON, October 23, School Forum, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Christian A. Herter

BOSTON, October 23, *The United Nations,* Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

BOSTON, October 23, *The United Nations,* James P. Warburg

DETROIT, October 23, *The UN at the Crossroads,* Harding F. Bancroft, R. G. Riddell

NEW YORK, October 23, *Austria Between East and West,* Karl Gruber, Foreign Minister of Austria

CLEVELAND, October 24, *Korea—Turning Point for the UN,* Chester Williams

DETROIT, October 24, *Who's Work,* Richard Miles

DETROIT, October 24, *United Nations: Promise or Illusion,* Doreen Gentile

PHILADELPHIA, October 24, *UN Observance Day,* Hon. Warren R. Austin, Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of India

ALBANY, October 25, Community UN Celebration, Louise Yim

MILWAUKEE, October 26, M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan

PHILADELPHIA, October 27, *The Economic Cooperation Administration,* William L. Batt

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Statement of the Ownership, Management, and Circulation Required by the Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, as Amended by the Acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) of

Foreign Policy Bulletin

Published weekly (every other week during June, July, August) at New York, N. Y. for October 1, 1950.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

Publisher—Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.
Editor—Vera Micheles Dean, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.
Managing editor—None.
Business manager—None.

2. The owner is:

Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.; Brooks Emeny, President, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.; Eustace Seligman, Treasurer, 48 Wall Street, New York 5, N. Y.; Thomas L. Power, Vice-President, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: 20,590.

VERA M. DEAN, Editor.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of September, 1950.

CAROLYN E. MARTIN, Notary Public for the State of New York, Qualified in New York County, No. 31-260600. (My commission expires March 30, 1951.)

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXX, No. 1, OCTOBER 13, 1950. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, *President;* VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor;* WILLIAM W. WADE, *Associate Editor.* Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.